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the respondents. An answer was duly entered by the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office for the appellants in their official capacity and 
thereafter an entry of appearance was filed by Robert D. Moore, as 
attorney for the appellants personally. An application was duly made 
to have the matter certified as a class action. A motion to intervene 
on behalf of Charlene Polly Cook was subsequently filed and granted. 
The respondents1 motion to certify the case as a class action was 
subsequently withdrawn but thereafter reinstated. The court on the 21st 
day of May, 1975, denied certification of the matter as a class action 
and thereafter the case was submitted on each party's motion for summary 
judgment. The trial court entered a memorandum decision on the 3rd day 
of June, 1975, and an extraordinary writ was thereafter entered prohibitii 
the appellants from imposing jail sentences or imprisonment on the re-
spondents in the event the respondents were convicted of the charges 
pending against them. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The relevant facts before the trial court consisted of the 
allegations of the respondents1 complaint and admitted by appellants 
that respondents, Larry J. Shelmidine and John R. Reeves, were charged 
with the crime of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
The case against Shelmidine was set for trial before Justice of the 
Peace Charles A. Jones on January 16, 1975, at 2:30 p.m. and the trial 
of Reeves before Lynn D. Bernard on March 25, 1975. Both of the 
respondents plead not guilty and are residents of Salt Lake County. 
The appellants are justices of the peace exercising precinct jurisdiction 
in Salt Lake County. At the time of the hearing on motion for summary 
judgment, it was stipulated that none of the appellants was a member of Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the Bar of the State of Utah. On the basis of the facts presented 
and the contentions of the respondents that appellants could not 
exercise jurisdiction over respondents, the trial court rendered a 
memorandum decision in which it found: 
Justice of the peace courts in Utah, manned 
by non-lawyer judges, are courts of convenience, 
particularly in isolated rural areas typical of 
most of this state in which there are few, and 
sometimes no attorneys. 
Modern transportation and communication have 
considerably alleviated much of the problem earlier 
encountered in effectuating a viable means of 
administering effective and speedy justice on the 
misdemeanor level. Nevertheless, of the 29 counties 
in Utah there are still eight counties with two or 
less resident attorneys and five counties with no 
resident attorney, for lawyers, whose livelihood 
is dependent upon the services they are able to 
render to people, have tended to settle in the 
more populous regions of the state, requiring 
the inhabitants in many areas to travel some 
considerable distance to obtain legal counsel. 
The impact of this on the administration of 
misdemeanor offenses -- the very type of offense 
with which a limited-jurisdiction, lay justice of 
the peace most frequently deals -- is immediately 
apparent: One-third of the counties of the state 
do not have enough resident lawyers to staff the 
justice courts and still have a prosecutor and 
defense counsel. 
If one is entitled, under the growing concepts 
of Due Process and fair trial, to legal counsel 
in a misdemeanor case where there is a possibility 
of imprisonment, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 
92 S^Ct. 2006, 32 U E d . 2d 530 (1972), see also 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 
9 L.Ed. 2d 799 (1953), the Due Process, the right 
to a fair trial and the right to counsel likewise 
mandate that under such circumstances only a 
lawyer-judge, qualified by training, background, 
and experience to comprehend and utilize counsel's 
legal arguments, can impose a sentence of imprison-
ment. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Th1s Court therefore finds and holds that the 
practice under Utah law which allows non-lawyer 
or lay justices of the peace to impose a jail 
sentence or right to a fair trial 1n violation 
of the mandate of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. 
. . . (T)he defendants are prohibited as lay judges 
from imposing imprisonment and jail sentence upon a 
conviction of the offenses over which they otherwise 
have jurisdiction. 
Respondents have asserted by way of statement of respondents 
points on cross appeal under Rule 74 and 75d, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure that the trial court erred in not directing that the writ 
of prohibition prevent defendants from hearing any criminal trials 
involving charges which may result in jail sentence. 
POINT I 
THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE SYSTEM IN THE STATE OF UTAH IS 
ESTABLISHED BY CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS 
AND IS THEREFORE PRESUMPTIVELY CORRECT AND SHOULD NOT BE 
RULED UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THE ABSENCE OF A COMPELLING 
FEDERAL DEMAND. 
The judicial power in the State of Utah is vested in the Senate 
sitting as a court of impeachment, the Supreme Court, District Courts 
and Justices of the Peace as well as other inferior courts established 
by law. Article VIII Section 1 Constitution of Utah. Justice of the 
peace courts have been part of the judicial system of Utah from 
territorial days. In the Matter of Wiseman, 1 Utah 39. The tradition 
of justice courts carried over into statehood with express recognition 
in the Constitution in Article VIII Section 8 which provides: 
The Legislature shall determine the number of 
justices of the peace to be elected, and shall fix 
by law their powers, duties and compensation. The 
jurisdiction of justices of the peace shall be as 
now provided by law, but the Legislature may restrict 
the same. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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And Article VIII Section 9 of the Constitution of the State of Utah 
provides for appeals from final judgments of the justice of the peace 
in civil and criminal cases to the district courts on both questions 
of law and fact. The Legislature of the State of Utah has made provisions 
for the establishment of various types of justices courts. § 10-6-74 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides for the appointment of city or town _• 
justices and Title 78 Chapter 5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides for 
the jurisdiction and qualification of justices courts. § 17*18*5 Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, provides that the Board of County Commissioners 
shall divide the county into precincts for the purpose of electing justic< 
of the peace and constables. The justice of the peace must reside and 
hold court in the precinct, city or town for which he was elected or 
appointed. § 78-5-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. City and town justices 
of the peace have exclusive original jurisdiction of cases arising by 
reason of a violation of any city or town ordinance. Criminal jurisdicti( 
of justices courts is provided in i 78-5-4 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and, 
in effect, provides for misdemeanor jurisdiction of fines up to $299 or 
imprisonment not to exceed six months or both. § 78-3-5 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, gives the district court jurisdiction to entertain 
appeals in criminal and civil cases from final judgments of the district 
court in accordance with the constitutional provisions heretofore 
mentioned. Consequently, the Utah Constitution and Statutes provide a 
comprehensive system for the functioning and operation of justices courts 
Under these circumstances, there is a strong presumption of constitution-
ality attendant to the Utah justice of the peace system. Tintic Standard 
Mining Co. v. Utah County, 80 Utah 491, 15 P.2d 633 (1932); 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 




Norville v, State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P.2d 937 (1940); 
Sord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449 (1967); United 
States v. National Dairy Products Corp,, 372 U.S. 29 (1963). In 
this instance, a presumption of reasonableness accompanies the exercise 
of the police power by the State. Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake, 
19 Utah 2d 329, 431 P.2d 559 (1967). The party assailing the legislative 
classification as arbitrary has the burden of showing it to be so. 
State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Consequently, the party plaintiffs below have the burden of overcoming 
the presumption of the validity of the Utah justice of the peace system. 
In attacking the legality of having a lay justice of the peace hear a 
case in which a jail sentence may be imposed, or as the trial court ruled 
prohibiting a lay justice from imposing a jail sentence, the respondents 
relied exclusively on the Federal Constitution. Only if principles of 
federal constitutional law overcome the presumption of validity can 
respondents prevail in this appeal. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH PROCEDURE WHICH ALLOWS A LAY JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 
TO PRESIDE AT A CASE INVOLVING A MATTER IN WHICH A JAIL 
SENTENCE COULD BE IMPOSED, OR TO IMPOSE A JAIL SENTENCE, 
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
Respondents contend that a denial of due process of law results 
when a lay justice of the peace is allowed to preside in a case in which 
a prison sentence could be imposed. The trial court apparently concluded 
that there was such a denial of due process of law if a prison sentence 
was actually imposed. It is submitted that neither conclusion is 
required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 




Lay justices of the peace have long been part of the English 
common law tradition. In Holdsworth, History of English Law, Vol. One, 
The Judicial System, it is observed with reference to the establishment 
of justices of the peace: 
In fact, the duties of the justices have for a long 
time past depended much more upon a mass of statute 
law than upon their commission; and, for the mis-
cellaneous governmental and judicial duties which 
were thus devolved upon them, a professional lawyer 
was not needed. The duties were done by the country 
gentry; and the office of justice of the peace thus 
afforded an excellent training for the knight of the 
shire. 
More recently, justices of the peace have been more representative of 
all classes of the community in England. Holdsworth, supra, page 292. 
However, it is noted: 
But the justices still retain their judicial powers, 
and some small remnant of those administrative powers 
which gave them, in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and 
eighteenth centuries, entire control over the local 
government of the country. 
In Giles, The Criminal Law, Rev. Ed. 1961, page 101, it is observed: 
Apart from these professional salaried magistrates, 
the work of the magistrates1 courts is done by the 
lay justices advised by a clerk who is either a 
solicitor or barrister. 
It would seem that the use of lay magistrates and justices of the peace 
in criminal and civil matters has a long history in English law. Hardin, 
A Social History of English Law, p. 71-73 (1966). 
The American colonialists borrowed heavily from English legal 
tradition.—— In Friedman, A History of American Law, 1973, it is 
observed: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In a common-law system, judges make at least some 
of the law, even if their theory denies this fact. 
American statesmen were not naive; they knew that it 
mattered what the judges believed and who they were. 
How judges were to be chosen and how they were to act 
was a political issue in the Revolutionary generation, 
at a pitch of intensity rarely reached before or since. 
8tate after state -- and the federal government --
fought political battles on issues of selection and 
control of the bench. 
The bench was not homogeneous. Judges varied in 
quality and qualification, in level and place, from 
local justices of the peace to the Supreme Court Chief 
Justice. English and colonial tradition had room for 
lay judges, as well as for judges learned in law. Lay 
judges flourished both at the top and the bottom of the 
pyramid. 
The lay judges were not necessarily politicians, though 
this was ordinarily the case. But they were invariably 
prominent local men. William E. Nelson has studied the 
background and careers of the eleven men who served as 
justices of the superior court of Massachusetts between 
1760 and 1774, on the even, that is, of the Revolution. 
Nine had never practiced law; six had never even studied 
law. All, however, of these liy judges had 'either been 
born into prominent families or become men of substance.1 
Stephen Sewall, chief justice in 1760, was the nephew 
of a former chief justice; he had served thirteen years 
as a tutor at Harvard College. 
The base of the pyramid was even more dominated by 
laymen. Lay justice did not necessarily mean popular or 
unlettered justice at the trial-court level. The English 
squires were laymen, but hardly men of the people. Lay 
justice in America had something of the character of rule 
§ 68-3-1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, adopts the common law of England 
as the law of the State of Utah except to the extent that it is 
in conflict with constitutional or statutory law or inconsistent 
with the natural and physical conditions of the state and this 
applies to criminal procedure as well. State v. Dean, 69 Utah 268, 
254 Pac. 142 (1927). 
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by the squires. Nor was lay justice necessarily informal. 
Laymen, after years on the bench, often soaked up the 
lawyer's jargon and tone. After all, lawyers frequently 
came to the bar after the briefest of clerkships and with 
little more than a smattering of Blackstone. Lay judges, 
then, did not absorb their law much differently than the 
average trained lawyer. 
It goes without need of citation that lay judges are prevalent today 
throughout the United States and in many remote areas are absolutely 
essential to a reasonable functioning of a judicial system. Smith, 
The Justice of the Peace System in the United States, 15 Cal. L. Rev. 
118 (1927). 
As the trial court noted in the instant case, five counties of the State 
of Utah have no resident attorney and eight counties of the twenty-nine 
counties in Utah have two or less resident attorneys. It may be con-
cluded that the historical use of lay judges was a recognition of 
necessity. To the extent that respondents contend that due process 
requires a lawyer judge in certain instances, there appears to be no 
historical justification for such a position. 
Due Process in Misdemeanor Cases 
The jurisdiction of justices of the peace in Utah is relatively 
limited. Imprisonment may be imposed but may not exceed six months. 
A fine of up to $299 may also be imposed. This standard is similar 
to the federal petty offense statute. 18 U.S.C. 13. In Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 154 (1968), the Supreme Court ruled that the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury was applicable to the states under 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, in Duncan, 
by dicta, the court asserted that petty offenses did not require jury 
trials. The same position was taken in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 
66 (1970). Most recently, in United States v. Goeltz, 513 F.2d 193 
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(10th Cir. 1975), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that there 
was no right to jury trial under the Sixth Amendment in a criminal case 
that merely involved a petty offense. Consequently! the severity of the 
penalty is to some degree a measure of the extent to which due process 
requires a particular procedure. Even today in the federal system, 
there is no mandatory requirement that United States magistrates be 
members of the local bar. 28 U.S.C. § 631(b). 
It is submitted that if the right to a jury trial is not so 
fundamental as to be encompassed within due process in a petty offense 
case, that there could be no requirement in a petty offense case for a 
lawyer judge. 
Due Process in Criminal Cases in General 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that in most instance 
the states are free to establish whatever procedures they feel are best 
suited for the interests of its people in the disposition of criminal 
cases. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). The critical focus 
in this case is not whether the due process clause of the Federal Con-
stitution is applicable to state criminal cases since it is clear it is. 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Rather, this case raises the 
question as to what degree of process must be followed. See, Note, 
Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on 
the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1510 (1975). Generally, 
the United States Supreme Court has said that due process requires a 
particular procedure when to deny the procedure would be a denial of 
"fundamental fairness shocking to the universal sense of justice." 
Kingsella v. United States, ex rel Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960). 
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The Supreme Court of the United States has as yet never imposed a 
requirement that a magistrate have any particular level of training 
or that he be admitted to the bar of the jurisdiction in which he is 
sitting. The case of Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972) 
is in point in this regard. There, the Supreme Court held that it was 
within the bounds of due process for the City of Tampa to authorize 
municipal court clerks who were neither lawyers or judges to issue 
warrants, stating that the requirement of being neutral and detached 
could be met by a layman. The defendant in Shadwick argued that a lay 
clerk was incapable of understanding and applying the principles embodied 
in the Fourth Amendment. To this, the court answered: 
It is less than clear, however, as to who could 
qualify as a 'judicial officer1 under appellants 
theory. There is some suggestion in appellant's 
brief that a judicial officer must be a lawyer 
or the municipal court judge himself . . . But 
it has never been held that only a lawyer or 
judge could grant a warrant, regardless of the 
court system or the type of warrant involved. 
In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-271 
(1960), the Court implied that United States 
Commissioners, many of whom were not lawyers or 
judges, were nonetheless ' independent judicial 
officers. ' J_d. at 347-48. 
The court then went on to state that the test for the qualifications 
of a magistrate in the present case was whether he was detached and 
capable of determining probably cause and held that non-lawyer magistrate! 
were capable of meeting the test. 
Appellant likewise has failed to demonstrate that 
these clerks lack capacity to determine probable 
cause. Our legal system has long entrusted non-
lawyers to evaluate more complex and significant 
factual data than that in the case at hand . ] T 
The significance and responsibility of these lay 
judgments betray any belief that the Tampa clerks 
could not determine probably cause for arrest. 
What we . . . reject today is any per se invalidation 
of a state of local warrant system on the ground 
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Communities may have sound reasons for delegating 
the responsibility of issuing warrants to competent 
personnel other than judges or lawyers. Id. at 352 
(Emphasis added). 
While Shadwick case decided only that non-lawyer, non-judicial 
clerks were constitutionally capable of deciding probably cause, it is 
relevant to the present case. The issue presently before the court 
is whether non-lawyer justices of the peace are per se unqualified to 
declare the law and determine the facts in application of the law 
in limited misdemeanor situations. The Shadwick court would reject 
such a blanket disqualification. The court in Shadwick placed great 
stock in the fact that the non-lawyer clerks who were deciding probable 
cause had limited jurisdiction and were closely supervised by judicial 
officers. Similarly, under the Utah system, justices of the peace 
benefit from required legal training, close higher court supervision 
and have only limited jurisdiction. 
Utah law requires close supervision and training of all justices 
of the peace, thus assuring that the system comport with reasonable 
fairness and due process. Utah Code Annotated, § 78-5-27, passed in 1971 
sets up a mandatory system of continuing education for justices of the 
peace: 
All justices of the peace shall attend one of 
two annual institutes to be supervised by the 
Utah Supreme Court. Any justice not attending 
one institute during the year shall vacate his 
office unless he has obtained a written excuse 
for good cause from the chief justice of the 
state Supreme Court. 
In other cases involving the loss of individual liberty, the 
Supreme Court has not been willing to require the extension of a full 
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panoply of constitutional rights. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 
(1972) the Supreme Court required certain due process standards be met 
prior to the revocation of a prisoner's parole. The court did not 
require as a sin qua non to the revocation of parole that the accused 
be afforded a lawyer. A preliminary probable cause type hearing followed 
by a more formal evidentiary hearing was all that was required. The 
court ruled with reference to the standard of professionalism of the 
persons making the determination to revoke parole that they need not be 
judges or lawyers. The court observed, jjh at 489: 
. . . (e) a 'neutral and detached1 hearing body such 
as a traditional parole board, members of which need 
not be judicial officers or lawyers; . . . 
Parole revocation may very well result in a longer period of incarceration 
than that that could be imposed by a lay justice of the peace in the State 
of Utah. The Supreme Court, however, was unwilling to say that due proces 
required a lawyer for the parolee or that the adjudicating body be made 
up of judges or lawyers. 
In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), the court was faced 
with a contention that in a revocation of probation that counsel should 
be required at all hearings. The court rejected such a rigid rule saying 
that it "would impose direct costs and serious collateral disadvantages 
without regard to the need or the likelihood in a particular case for a 
constructive contribution by counsel." The court ruled only that a 
probationer was entitled to the preliminary and final revocation hearing 
under the conditions specified in Morrissey. The court's observation 
is applicable to the issue raised in this case. 
In Wolff v.McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the court was faced with 
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the question as to what procedural rights a prisoner confined in an 
institution was entitled to before being subjected to disciplinary action. 
The court concluded that the Morrissey and Scarpelli standards need not 
be met even though a prisoner would face serious loss of liberty. The 
court recognized the difference between prison disciplinary proceedings 
and court processes. A written statement of the charges and the hearing 
were the primary benefits that the court felt the prisoner entitled to. 
It denied the contention that a prisoner should be entitled to counsel 
and further said, "We decline to rule that the adjustment committee which 
conducts the required hearings at the Nebraska prison complex and 
determines whether to revoke good time is not sufficiently impartial to 
satisfy due process." The adjudication committee consisted of prison 
officials with no indication that there was lawyer participation. It is 
submitted, therefore, that the Supreme Court's apparent unwillingness to 
require lawyer trained personnel in situations similar to those at issue 
in this case does not make the requirement of a lawyer judge fundamental 
to due process. As was noted by the Arizona Supreme Court in Crouch v. Tl 
Justice of the Peace Court of the Sixth Precinct, 7 Ariz. App. 460, 440 
P.2d 1,000 (1968): 
The fact that a Justice of the Peace is not an 
attorney does not mean that he is per se un-
qualified to declare the law in the limited 
type of situations over which he has jurisdiction. 
The fact that a judicial error may be made in a 
proceeding does not necessarily imply a denial 
of due process of law. The 14th Amendment does 
not assure immunity from judicial error. 
See also, State v. Lynch, 197 Ariz. 463, 489 P.2d 697 (1971); State v. 
Dziggel, 16 Ariz. App. 289, 492 P.2d 1227 (1972). The Illinois Supreme 
Court has also reached a similar result in City of Decatur v. Kushmer, 
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43 111. 2d 334, 253 N.E.2d 425 (1969). Cases from other jurisdictions 
have also reached the same general conclusion in a variety of contexts. 
Mississippi County v. Green, 200 Ark. 204, 138 S.W. 2d 377 (1940); 
State v. Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 91 Atl. 274 (1914); State ex re!. Sellars v. 
Parker, 87 Fla. 181, 100 So. 260 (1924); Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W. 2d 772 
(Ky. 1973) appeal dismissed 414 U.S. 885 (1973); Attorney General ex rel. 
Cook v. O'Neill, 280 Mich. 649, 274 N.W. 445 (1937); Spruill v. Bateman, 
162 N.C. 588, 77 S.E. 768 (1913); In re Hudson County, 106 N.J. 62, 144 
Atl. 169 (1928); State ex rel. Swann v. Freshour, 219 Tenn. 482, 410 S.W. 
2d 885 (1967. 
Utah's Two Tier System Providing for Trial De Novo on Appeal Adequately 
Satisfies Due Process Standards 
The Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 9, provides that appeal 
are available from the final judgment of a justice of the peace in crimina 
cases to the district courts on both questions of law and fact with such 
limitations and restrictions as may be provided by law. The legislature 
has provided for a right of trial de novo in an appeal from a justice 
court. § 77-57-43 Utah Code Annotated, 1953. A defendant may bypass the 
justice court altogether by pleading guilty and obtaining a trial de novo 
without prejudice before the district court. Weaver v. Kimball, 59 Utah 
72, 202 Pac. 9 (1921); i 77-57-38 Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Utah law 
provides for a two-tier system. An accused who is tried before a justice 
of the peace who is not a lawyer has an absolute right to have his case 
heard anew before the district court where he would have a lawyer judge. 
The United States Supreme Court has never required that a state" provide 
the right to appeal to a defendant in a criminal case. Griffin v. Illinoi 
351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
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requirement of due process of law in providing an appellate process. 
In addition, the appellate process meets the very complaint raised by 
respondents in the instant case. By extending the right to appeal to a 
trial de novo the accused obtains a complete review of both the 
adjudication and sentencing portions of his case and since this process 
is extended to him as a matter of right, he has every opportunity to 
have the due process respondent contends is constitutionally mandated. 
The Utah system is substantially different than that which was 
before the California Supreme Court in Gordon v. The Justice Court, 
12 Cal. 3d 326, 525 P.2d 72 (1974) where the California Supreme Court 
held that the use of non-attorney justices to try misdemeanors where 
there was a possibility of imprisonment was a violation of due process 
of law. Under California law, however, the accused does not have a right 
to a trial de novo, but must appeal his case, Cal. Penal Code § 1466 (Wesi 
1970). It is a matter of discretion whether the defendant is granted 
a trial de novo in California. Cal. Penal Code i 1469 (West 1970). 
Added to this problem in California is the fact that Justice Courts are 
not courts of record (Cal. Const., Art. VI, § 1 ) , thus making the appeal 
procedure more inadequate since any appeal would be based solely "upon 
a statement of the case settled or prepared by the non-attorney judge 
himself." 115 Cal. Rptr. at 638. Thus, it is obvious that the Californi 
system is not as protective of the accused's rights as is Utah's where 
the defendant has an absolute right to a trial de novo. The due process 
considerations in determining the constitutional validity of the 
California system are different than in a jurisdiction where a trial 
de novo is the defendant's right. 
In Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), the Supreme Court held that 
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an accused was not entitled to counsel as a matter of due process on his 
discretionary appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina where he 
otherwise had counsel at the time of his first appeal. The inverse 
of that situation is present in the instant case, and the same conclusion 
should hold true if a lawyer judge on appeal satisfies due process 
requirements. In other contexts, this would render moot the argument 
being advanced by the respondents but for their efforts at obtaining 
extraordinary relief. Cf. Costarelli v. Massachusetts, 43 L.W. 4510 
(USSC 1975). 
The two-tier system for adjudicating less serious criminal cases 
was held in Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972) to satisfy due 
process, even though the judge in the de novo case could impose a 
higher penalty. The court acknowledged that many states do not 
require justice court judges to be attorneys and that the mere fact 
that a defendant had to endure a trial in an inferior court with less 
adequate protections did not deny due process where trial de novo 
was available. The court stated: 
(M)any . . . systems . . . lack some of the 
safeguards provided in more serious criminal 
cases . . . Some, including Kentucky, do not 
record proceedings and the judges may not be 
trained for their positions either by experience 
or schooling. 
We are not persuaded, however, that the Kentucky 
arrangement for dealing with the less serious 
offenses disadvantages defendants any more or 
any less than trials conducted in a court of 
general jurisdiction in the first instance, as 
long as the latter are always available. 
407 U.S. at 113, 118. 
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Proceedings in the inferior courts are simple and 
speedy . . . Such proceedings offer a defendant 
the opportunity to learn about the prosecution's 
case and, if he chooses, he need not reveal his 
own. He may also plead guilty without a trial and 
promptly secure a de novo trial in a court of 
general criminal jurisdiction. He cannot, and will 
not, face the realistic threat of a prison sentence 
in the inferior court without having the help of 
counsel, whose advice will also be available in 
determining whether to seek a new trial, with the 
slate wiped clean, or to accept the penalty imposed 
by the inferior court. The State has no such options, 
Should it not prevail in the lower court, the case 
is terminated, whereas the defendant has the choice 
of beginning anew. In reality his choices are to 
accept the decision of the judge and the sentence 
imposed in the inferior court or to reject what in 
effect is no more than an offer in settlement of his 
case and seek the judgment of judge or jury in the 
superior court, with sentence to be determined by! 
the full record made in that court. 407 U.S. at 
119 (Emphasis added). 
The trial court rejected the contention that the two-tier system 
adequately affords due process. (See, page 6 Memorandum Opinion). The 
trial court concluded that the respondents were entitled to a fair trial 
in the first instance citing Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 
(1972)(1 11}is submitted that the analogy to the Ward case and its 
predecessor, Toomey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), is inapplicable in the 
instant situation. In both cases, the Supreme Court held that where a 
mayor before whom the defendant was tried on traffic offenses had a 
substantial financial interest in the outcome that trial before such an 
individual was a denial of due process. The court indicated that trial 
was required before a disinterested or impartial judicial officer. The 
issue in the instant case in no way involves the question of whether 
a judge has such an immediate interest in the outcome of the case as to 
disqualify him. A lay judge may be totally impartial where a lawyer 
judge does not necessarily guarantee any greater degree of impartiality. 
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I't cannot be said that per se a trial before a non-lawyer judge is the 
equivalent of a trial before a judge that has a financial interest in 
the outcome. In both the Ward and Toomey cases although not mentioned 
in the opinion, it would appear that trial was held before an executive 
official who was not necessarily a lawyer and this was not a factor 
in the court's opinions. 
It is submitted that Utah's two-tier system effectively answers 
the respondents' contentions that trial in the first instance before a 
lay justice of the peace denies due process of law if imprisonment 
may be imposed or is imposed. 
Based on all the above considerations, it is submitted that the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution does not require a lawyer judge where a sentence of incarcera 
tion can or is in fact imposed. 
POINT III 
THE UTAH JUSTICE OF THE PEACE SYSTEM DOES NOT VIOLATE THE 
EQUAL PROTECTION PROVISIONS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. 
A. Proper Classification 
The respondents in their complaint raised a contention that there 
was a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States because persons tried for the same 
offense before a city judge in Salt Lake County could receive a trial 
before a lawyer whereas for the most part persons tried before a justice 
of the peace in the same county would be tried by non-lawyers. Respondent 
therefore, claimed the appropriate classification to be that of Salt Lake 
County for determining whether a denial of equal protection had occurred. 
The trial court's decision does not appear to be predicated upon a denial 
of equal protection. However, the Memorandum Opinion is not altogether 
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clear as to the exact basis upon which the trial court relied. 
Therefore, the equal protection issue should be considered by this 
court. 
It is submitted that in determining what is an appropriate 
classification for applying equal protection standards that Salt Lake 
County is not the proper classification standard. In establishing the 
office of justice of the peace, the Utah Constitution purports to 
operate statewide. The legislative implementation of the constitutional 
office of justice of the peace is not limited to Salt Lake County but is 
applicable throughout the State of Utah. Consequently, the appropriate 
category for classification is the State of Utah not just Salt Lake 
County. When the classification is examined on a statewide basis, it 
appears that there is no merit to a claim of a denial of equal protection, 
B. Rational Basis Standard 
The United States Supreme Court has formulated two standards for 
assessing whether a legislative classification violates the equal 
protection standards of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, Gunther, The 
Supreme Court 1971 Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972). 
Where a category for legislative action is based upon political or 
racial criteria, it is a "suspect classification." Harper v. Virginia 
Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). In those instances, there must 
be ample evidence to justify the classification. In other instances, 
where such a classification basis is absent, the legislative classificatic 
will stand if there is any rational basis on which to justify the 
differentiation. Most recently, in Stanton v. Stanton, 95 S.Ct. 1373 
(1975) the Supreme Court indicated that it need not determine whether a 
classification difference based on sex was a suspect category. The oourt 
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held that the matter could be decided on the more fundamental rational 
basis test. 
In the area of criminal law, the application of the equal 
protection clause has been most readily identified with assuring that 
the benefits of a fair trial have been extended to defendants 
irrespective of their wealth. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In the instant case, there is 
no question concerning different treatment of individuals of varying 
economic position. The situation here is one of geographical location 
as to the place of the commission of the offense and the education of 
the judge. It is submitted that if any rational basis can be found 
justifying lay justices of the peace that such classification can with-
stand constitutional scrutiny. A similar argument on equal protection 
grounds was raised in Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W. 2d 772 (Ky. 1973) 
where the Kentucky Court of Appeals observed: 
There has been no showing in this case that non-lawyer 
police judges, proportionately, convict more defendants, 
impose higher sentences, or are reversed more on appeal, 
than lawyer judges. There is no basis for any finding 
that they are less fair and impartial in cases in which 
the defendant, as he is entitled, is represented by 
counsel, or that their ignorance of the law harms the 
accused more than the government. There is no support 
for the assertion that the non-lawyer judge, generally, 
will accept the prosecutor's version of the law rather 
than that of defense counsel. 
We conclude that the bases for the classification 
reasonably justify the classification in the balance 
of the bases against possible detriment factors. 
490 S.W. 2d 777. 
It is submitted that when the State of Utah is considered as the unit of 
classification that given its history, geography and demography that the 
differentiation that the legislature has made is not only reasonable but 
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essential. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a state 
need only have some justifiable basis in enacting legislation treating 
persons differently in order to sustain the legislation. Thus, the 
court has ruled that there is no denial of equal protection because 
students in one school district receive greater financial support than 
students in another school district because of a different tax base. 
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Thus, all 
school districts are not required to provide the same educational 
advantages. Not all judicial forums need provide a judge of the same 
degree of sophistication. 
In McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973), the court held that 
a New York statute denying certain state prisoners good time credit for 
parole eligibility for the period of their pre-sentence incarceration 
and granting good time credit to those released on bail did not deny 
equal protection since the state was able to articulate a rehabilitative 
goal in such a differentiation. 
In Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973), the court said that a 
rational justification was the standard to be applied in determining 
whether Oregon law requiring an appellate filing fee for indigents seekin 
to appeal adverse welfare decisions was unconstitutional. The court 
upheld the requirement in the face of an equal protection argument findin 
that the categorization of requiring a fee for welfare appeals and not in 
criminal cases involving loss of liberty and civil cases involving 
termination of parental rights was not such an arbitrary classification 
as to deny equal protection. 
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In view of the fact that large segments of Utah must rely upon lay 
judges as a part of the system of courts and do not have access to lawyers 
allowing lay judges to serve as justices of the peace is not irrational. 
City judges serve mostly in metropolitan areas and frequently in areas 
where attorneys are most prevalent. Justices of the peace often have 
jurisdiction in remote areas and lawyers are often unavailable to act as 
judges if they must reside in the precinct. Hence, it cannot be said 
that the failure to require justices of the peace to be lawyers is 
irrational. 
Salt Lake County 
Even assuming that the respondents1 equal protection unit of 
classification of Salt Lake County is the proper classification for 
considering whether the current justice of the peace system violates 
equal protection, it is submitted that the rational basis test would 
still be satisfied. In Salzberg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954), the 
United States Supreme Court upheld legislation in the State of Maryland 
that treated certain defendants in criminal cases differently in one 
county over another as against a claim of denial of equal protection. 
The court found the justification based on the different problems within 
the particular county. Most recently, in In re Trader, 16 Cr.L.Rep. 2072 
(Md. Ct. of App. 1974), the Maryland Court, referring to the Salzberg 
case, upheld different treatment of juveniles within the same county 
finding that the circumstances within the county justified the differenti 
ation. In the instant case, there is no evidence to show why a classifi-
cation requiring city judges in Salt Lake City to be lawyers and allowing 
justices of the peace in Salt Lake County encompassing a more rural area 
is not a legitimate classification. Since the burden is on the 
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a presumption that the classification is constitutional, it is submitted 
that respondents did not establish their contention of a violation of 
equal protection of the laws. 
POINT IV 
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
IS NOT VIOLATED BY ALLOWING A DEFENDANT IN A MISDEMEANOR 
CRIMINAL CASE TO BE TRIED AND SENTENCED TO A TERM OF 
IMPRISONMENT BY A NON-LAWYER JUDGE. 
The trial court concluded that if an accused was entitled to legal 
counsel in a misdemeanor case where there was a possibility of imprison-
ment, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), that due process 
likewise mandated a lawyer judge to "comprehend and utilize counsel's 
legal arguments.11 The trial court then concluded that only a lawyer 
judge could impose a sentence of imprisonment. The California Supreme 
Court in Gordon v. The Justice Court, supra, ruled that permitting non-
lawyer judges to preside over a criminal trial in which the offense is 
punishable by jail sentence violated the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The California court concluded that a fair trial 
was not otherwise possible. The due process argument has heretofore been 
treated and the only question is whether the Sixth Amendment requires a 
lawyer judge in order to make the right to counsel effective. 
It is submitted that there is no constitutional requirement for a 
lawyer judge in cases where imprisonment is imposed or may be imposed as 
a matter of effectuating the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment to 
the Constitution flatly states that the accused shall enjoy the right Htc 
have the assistance of counsel for his defense." At the time of the 
adoption of the Sixth Amendment, lay judges were quite common. Counsel 
could provide an accused with guidance through the labryinth of legal 
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accused's defense. The position that seemed to be taken by the trial 
court in the instant case is that only a lawyer can understand a lawyer. 
If such is the case, the legal profession instead of becoming more adept 
in the articulation of a client's cause would appear to have become 
so mute that only a narrow class of persons can comprehend what is being 
said. Such simply is not the case. A lawyer can still be an effective 
advocate for his client before a non-lawyer judge. He can marshall the 
facts in a way to make them more comprehendable to the trier of fact. 
The lawyer performs this function when the case is submitted to a lay jun 
He can articulate the legal principles involved to a lay judge in the sam< 
fashion that he often must articulate such principles when presenting the 
case for decision to a lay jury. He can still raise in an intelligent 
and persuasive fashion all that reasonable advocacy would expect. 
Essentially, the assistance of counsel is for "the right to be heard." 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The same reasons that compel 
the right to counsel do not necessarily mandate a lawyer trained judge. 
Laymen in many contexts are required to apply and appreciate legal 
principles. Income tax, commercial law, corporate law are all areas 
where laymen often effectively handle legal matters. In the field of 
criminal law, laymen most frequently apply the law, these being 
policemen, charged with interpreting the law as well as making a 
determination as to whether the process of government should be directed 
against a person's activities. The logical extension of the contention 
that the Sixth Amendment is not meaningful unless there is a lawyer 
listening to counsel's presentation would require lawyer juries and 
maybe lawyer officials in the pre-judicial enforcement of the criminal 
law. Such an extension would be impossible to meet and most unnecessary. 
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In
 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the United States Supreme Court 
adopted a standard for required procedures in juvenile cases similar 
in some respects to that later required in misdemeanor cases in 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra. Thus, the court required that a juvenile 
have the right to counsel where the child may be subjected to the loss 
of his liberty. In the same opinion, however, the court noted that in 
the juvenile justice system as it existed at the time of Gault according 
to the National Crime Report "indicates that half of these judges have 
no undergraduate degree, a fifth have no college education at all, a 
fifth are not members of the bar, and three-quarters devote less than 
one-fourth of their time to juvenile matters." It also noted that the 
George Washington University Center for Behavioral Sciences of 1965 did 
a detailed statistical study of juvenile court judges and found that 
"about a quarter of these judges have no law school training at all." 
Even with those observations, the court did not impose any requirement 
that a juvenile be brought before a judge who is a member of the bar 
or who has any particular standard of training. The court laid out 
numerous rights that a juvenile may have including the right to counsel 
but apparently at the time of Gault the court believed the right to 
counsel to be sufficient to protect a juvenile accused without additional 
requiring that the judge be a member of the bar. It is submitted therefoi 
that there is no Sixth Amendment right to a lawyer judge and that the 
analogy adopted by the trial court and by the California Supreme Court to 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, is not one that is mandated by the Federal 
Constitution. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court in the instant 
case erred in concluding that an accused has a constitutional right to 
a lawyer judge before a sentence to imprisonment can be imposed. An 
examination of the due process, equal protection and right to counsel 
arguments reveals that the Constitution of the United States does not 
require that an accused be tried by a lawyer judge before a sentence of 
imprisonment can be imposed. Nothing in the Constitution of the United 
States says anything about the qualifications of the federal judiciary. 
It has been suggested from time to time that a non-lawyer should be 
appointed to the Supreme Court. In some jurisdictions, the juries 
actually fix the sentence of imprisonment. To mandate the requirement 
of lawyer judges would not only distort the historical meaning of the 
Constitution of the United States but would'place an immense burden 
on the present judicial system. The impact of upholding the trial 
couft's decision would be difficult to calculate. This court should 
reverse the trial court and conclude that lawyer judges are not required 
before a sentence of imprisonment can be imposed or a case adjudicated 
where imprisonment may be a possibility. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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